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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
flicting interests. And, by not acting solely for the benefit of the estate, the
administrator breached his fiduciary obligation. Consequently, the agreement's
provision for a five percent real estate commission was inapplicable. Without
either the administrator or the attorney receiving a commission, the Court concluded that the administrator's offeror's bid was the highest and therefore
directed that the property be sold to him.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
As CONSTITUTING ABANDONMENT
It has been held in this state that wilful refusal to have sexual relations in
marriage, if without sufficient legal cause, constitutes abandonment,' and as
such will support an action for separation under Section 1161 of the Civil
2
Practice Act.
In Diemer v. Diemer,3 the Court reexamined this holding and in addition,
was forced to interpret what constitutes, first, a wilful refusal, and secondly,
sufficient legal cause. This case involved cross actions for separation. The parties
to the action had married in a Protestant Church about five years prior to
this suit, in accordance with the husband's faith, although the wife was Roman
Catholic. They were both approximately forty years of age at the time of their
marriage and had considered and discussed the possible problems that might
confront them. The husband made it entirely clear that he was firm in his
faith and too old to change. His wife agreed with his position and expressed a
desire to attend his church. This she did, and a year and a half after their
marriage, she became a member of his congregation. Their marriage was happy
and untroubled and the husband was admittedly, by the wife's own trial testimony, a fine man and a good husband. About three years after the marriage a
child was born, and at about the same time the wife began to regret her loss of
the Catholic faith. She consulted a priest, and was told that in the eyes of the
Church, her marriage was invalid.
She then decided, and so informed her husband, that her marital relations
would be denied to him until he remarried her in the Catholic Church. He
refused but she remained firm in her denials. They continued to live together
in this manner for several months until finally the husband realized his wife
would not change her mind. He then left home and commenced this suit, continuing to support her and the child.
In trial court, he sued for separation on the grounds of cruel and inhuman
treatment.4 The Court denied a legal separation but awarded custody of the
WITHHOLDING OF SEXUAL RELATIONS

1. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605 (1926).
2. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1161(3) states that an action for separation is maintainable
for the abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant.
3. 8 N.Y.2d 206, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960).
4. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1161(1) provides for a separation based on the cruel and
inhuman treatment of plaintiff by defendant.
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child to the wife. The Appellate Division affirmed in a memorandum decision
with one dissent.
On review by the Court of Appeals, it was noted that the decisions of both
lower courts were based on the fact that, as to proving cruel and inhuman
treatment, the wife's conduct was not intentionally intended to produce harm,
and that apparently the husband had not actually sustained any damage to
his health. The Court felt that the criteria thus applied was too restrictive,
and that the essentials of cruelty are here established; however, the Court
preferred to base its opinion on the ground of abandonment as alleged and
proved by the facts. Abandonment is no longer limited to a mere "technical
physical separation", 7 but is rather a denial of a fundamental marital right
which strikes at the civil institution of marriage.
The Court, in Mirizio v. Mirizio,8 was faced with a situation somewhat
similar to the present case. There the parties had been married in a civil ceremony, with a prior agreement not to consumate their marriage until another
ceremony had been performed in a Catholic Church in accordance with the
wife's faith. After the civil ceremony, the husband refused to comply with the
agreement, and the wife therefore refused to consumate the marriage. The wife
subsequently commenced an action for separation on the ground of abandonment, and in a well reasoned opinion considering the underlying issues of law
and policy, the Court held that her denial of sexual relations was a denial of
a right so fundamental to the civil institution of marriage as to undermine the
essential structure of that institution, and therefore, her legal misconduct was
a valid defense to the action. It is meaningful to note that the equities of the
situation were with the wife in that case, as the prenuptial agreement was
recognized, and the husband's refusal to comply with that agreement was
totally without justification. But the Court felt that the denial of sexual relations was so antagonistic to the institution of marriage that public policy demanded she be granted no legal relief.
It is in marriage and only in marriage that the State condones sexual relations. Any other right arising out of the marriage contract can be legally
contracted for. It is, therefore, this one essential attribute that distinguishes the
institution from all other legal contracts. To deny this fundamental right
denies and defeats the institution of marriage itself.
The Court holds that-the reasoning in the Miriiio case dictates the conclusion here. There is no hostility toward religion or principles of moral conduct on
the part of the Court, but "as a matter of long-continued policy... [our state]
5. 6 A.D.2d 822, 176 N.Y.S.2d 231 (2d Dep't 1958).
6. See Sherman v. Sherman, 7 N.Y2d 1032, 200 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1960), where a
separation was granted on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. The cruelty
amounted to excessive spending by the wife, "making an unhappy home" and causing the
husband "great mental pain and suffering."
7. Heermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120, 126 (1866).
8. Supra note 1.
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has fixed the status of the marriage contract as a civil contract", and as such,
an unjustified denial of primary rights strikes at the heart of the contract itself.
It is only for this Court to decide then whether the denial was legally
justified. The Court holds it was not. The argument that the suffering caused
was unintentional cannot stand. It was the wife's purpose in denying sexual relations to coerce the husband into submitting to her request. This was admitted
and she cannot now argue she did not intend him to suffer.
The mere fact that she acted without malice, and through a deep religious
conviction, gave her acts no legal justification. And, if she be free to repudiate
the validity of her marriage, her husband also must enjoy the same privileges
and be allowed to free himself of his marital obligations.
The majority of this Court cannot agree with defendant's further contention that the husband may not prevail on the ground of abandonment because the conduct was characterized in the complaint as cruelty. The Court
holds that the time has passed when form was all important and the pleader
was absolutely bound by the labels he placed on the allegations in his complaint. The complaint here alleges, and the defendant has admitted in her testimony, all the facts necessary to support an action for separation based on
abandonment. It is for the Court to determine the legal force and effect of those
allegations.
By a 5-2 decision, the Court reversed the Appellate Division, and directed
that a decree of separation be granted in favor of the husband.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Desmond does not go to the merits of
the case, but is based on the Court's discussion of the issue of abandonment
when abandonment was not pleaded. Judge Desmond feels this to be a departure
from the settled rule that parties to a private suit fix the theory of suit and
no appellate court can present the losing side with a new theory.
With this contention the writer cannot agree. The Civil Practice Act requires pleadings contain "a plain and concise statement of the material facts
on which the party pleading relies". 10 The Rules of Civil Practice for a complaint in an action for separation requires only that the pleader must "specify
particularly the nature and circumstances of the defendant's misconduct and
set forth the time and place of each act complained of with reasonable certainty"."
The cause of action for separation is alleged. The facts pleaded constitute
abandonment. The mere fact that the wife's conduct was not so labeled should
not prevent the court from determining the legal force and effect of the facts
pleaded. It was held in Savings Bank of New London v. New York Trust Co.1"
that "Neither the prayer for relief nor the theories of the plaintiff nor his
9. Id. at 83, 150 N.E. 608.
10. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 241.
11.
12.

N.Y. Rules of Civ. Prac. Rule 280.
Misc. -, 27 N.Y.S.2d 963, 971 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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characterization of the plea control the court ...in its construction of the
pleading nor legal effect thereof, nor the wrong shown by the facts, nor as to
the relief or remedy to be granted... " To the writer this appears to be the
better view.
Nunc Pro Tunc

ORDEs UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION

1774.

The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to install in the record a fact
which, through mistake, oversight, or other error, has been omitted from the
record.' 3 "While a court may record an existing fact nunc pro tune, it cannot
record a fact as of a prior date when it did not then exist." 14
In the case of Cornell v. Comell,'5 the plaintiff wife obtained an interlocutory divorce decree from Elven Cornell in 1915. In 1930 she remarried.
Elven died in 1938, and her second husband died in 1956. The latter's will left
his residuary estate to the intervenor in the present case. The plaintiff elected
to take her intestate share. The intervenor contended that since no final judgment was entered upon plaintiff's interlocutory divorce decree, her marriage
in 1930 was void. This is a suit to have that final decree entered nunc pro tunc.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and entered the order.
The Appellate Division had reversed the trial court,'0 and denied such
an order relying on the 1909 case of In re Crandall's Estate.'7 In that case,
the husband obtained an interlocutory divorce decree. He then died after the
interlocutory period had expired without a final judgment being entered. After
his death, his former attorney sought a nunc pro tune order to have such judgment entered. The Court of Appeals held that Section 1774 of the Code of
Civil Procedure prevented such an order.
In the Cornell case, the plaintiff's first husband died before Section 1176
of the Civil Practice Act came into effect,' 8 therefore Section 1774 of the old
Code controls this case as well. The relevant portion provided, "Within thirty
days after the expiration of said period of three months final judgment shall be
entered as of course ... unless for sufficient cause the court in the meantime
shall have otherwise ordered." 'o
The Court in the Crandallcase held that".., the entry of final judgment,
especially under the circumstances presented to us, [is not] automatic and of
course." 20 These circumstances were that the husband, who had obtained the
13. Merrick v. Merrick, 266 N.Y. 120, 194 N.E. 55 (1934).
14. Guarantee Trust Co. v. Philadelphia, Reading & N.E. R.R. Co., 160 N.Y. 1, 7, 54
N.E. 575, 577 (1899). See also, Mohrmann v. Kob, 291 NY. 181, 5-1 N.E.2d 921 (1934).
15. 7 N.Y.2d 164, 196 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1959).
16. 9 A.D.2d 11, 189 N.Y.S.2d 812 (3d Dep't 1959).
17. 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578 (1909).
18. This amendment became effective September 1, 1946. The N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
replaced the Code of Civ. Proc. in 1920.
19. The several amendments to the N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1774 did not alter this
language between the time of the Crandall case and the original divorce suit between the
Cornells in 1915.
20. Supra note 17 at 131, 89 N.E. 580 (1909).

